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Hanoverian Politicks:
IN A
LETTER
FROM A
GENTLEMAN
AT THE
COURT of *HANOVER*,
TO HIS
FRIEND in ENGLAND,
CONCERNING
The Present Posture of AFFAIRS on
the CONTINENT.

L O N D O N:

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History and Politics:

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A
LETTER
FROM A
GENTLEMAN at *HANOVER*
TO HIS
FRIEND in *ENGLAND*,
Concerning the
State of AFFAIRS on the Continent.

Dear Sir,



T is almost impossible to express the Joy with which his M-je--y was received, by his Subjects here, on his Arrival: He is in perfect Health (God be thanked;) and my Lord *H--rr--gt--n* is arrived safe. I am heartily sorry for the ill Success of the Allies at *Fon-tenoy*; but it seems to have made no Impres- sion on the K—g; and he appears less con-
B cerned

cerned than others on the Occasion ; which I attribute to his M-je-y's known Courage and Intrepidity.

We cannot sufficiently applaud the Heroick Conduct of the Duke of *C-mb-rl--d*, nor is the gallant Behaviour of the *British* and *Honoverian* Forces to be sufficiently extolled : By all Accounts they performed Wonders ; and according to the Reports of the Officers, that are come hither to recruit, nothing but the Timidity of the *Dutch* prevented them the Honour of the Day. The Army is very much decreased by the Numbers that dye of the Wounded, so that our Loss may be computed at near twice what it was reckoned to be at the first.

My Sorrow for our ill Success is in some Part alleviated by the excellent Behaviour of the *H ——— ns*, by which they have entirely cleared themselves of such Imputations as were laid to them at *Dettingen* ; it gives the K——g no small Satisfaction ; and, I hope, it may create more Harmony between them and us, than has existed for some Time past : Could the Gallantry of their Behaviour but extinguish those Prejudices and Jealousies which we conceive of each other, such Effects might be of more intrinsic Value than even a Victory. However, I do
not

not doubt but my Countrymen will not fail having a better Opinion of the *H——n* Courage than they seem to have been possessed with formerly.

Our Politicians, here, I assure you, reason very extraordinarily upon the Behaviour of the *Dutch*; and some do not scruple to affirm, that their General advised the Attack contrary to all others Sentiments; and even when he was well acquainted with the vastly superiour Force of the Enemy: *Which, say they, appears by his soliciting the States General for Reinforcements, declaring, in his Letters to them, that otherwise we should not be able to keep the Field against the French, much less to perform any Thing considerable.* This indiscreet Zeal of his, for attacking the Enemy, affords Matter of much Speculation.——

Our deepest Politicians seem to think, that their H-ghM-ght-n-ss had sent him Orders to be thoroughly assured of our Earnestness before they would send any more Forces; which he could no way be so well assured of himself, nor so entirely convince his Masters of, as by bringing us to an Engagement, *tho' even on bad Terms.* Others think it was his own Doings, and make the worse of it as he did not second us by attacking the Village of *Fontenoy*, as he had promised;

even when reinforced by two Battalions, which his R -- l Highness ordered to his Assistance. This Behaviour, say they, looks very *mysterious*, the more especially as the States have not given him the least Check for it ; but on the contrary seem to acquiesce entirely in his Conduct,

I cannot know how our Politicians at home, consider these Matters, but I assure you those of *H-n-v-r* do not scruple to assert roundly; that the *D--ch* bubble us on all Hands ; and tho' here they are not a trading People, nevertheless they judge so well of ours, as to think us in the Wrong to carry on the War, unless the *Dutch* come entirely into it ; and even then, say they, it is difficult to put Confidence in them.

Thy seem here to be mightily surprised at our Indolence, in suffering our Allies to carry on an advantageous Trade, with our Enemies, while we run all the Hazards of the War for their Sakes, and incline to think, that our Jealousy on account of his *M-j--ft-y's* having too much paternal Affection for these *Dominions*, might be lessened by that for our *Commerce*, which we see daily encroached on in all Shapes. "*Ha-nov-r*, say they, can never rival *England*" in

“ in Trade; and is not a natural Friend and
 “ Ally on the Continent, united by similar
 “ Interests; the same Religion, and the
 “ same King, to be cherished rather than
 “ crushed and despised? Forbear then your
 “ Jealousy founded on imaginary Reasons.
 “ and exert it where there is apparent
 “ Occasion.”

Whether they argue justly, or not, I
 must refer to your Judgment, since you
 have more Opportunities than I to inspect
 Facts of this Nature. — Nor am I able,
 entirely, to satisfy myself, from what Mo-
 tives the Sanguinity of these People for our
Commerce does arise, unless they imagine,
 and that perhaps justly, that their own Wel-
 fare has a Dependance on our Riches. How-
 ever it be, I assure you, that they look on
 Acquisitions in *Trade*, to be more advantage-
 ous to us, than any that we can make on
 the *Continent*: And often ask, Why we do
 not demand a greater naval Assistance of
 the *D—ch*, that we might be enabled to
 send some Squadrons purposely to attack the
French in their Settlements, in the *East* or
West Indies, or on the *African Coast*, the
 only Place where we can do them any con-
 siderable Harm. They are exceeding soli-
 citous about what Methods we must take,
 on a Peace with *Spain*, to regain that Trade
 which they alledge our *Neighbours* have
 taken

taken great Pains, since the Commencement of the *Spanish* War, to deprive us of entirely. And which the Politicians here regard, as the Principal Motive of the *States* not declaring War against *France*, lest the *French* should intercept them in that Commerce.—— Or perhaps entirely destroy it, by persuading the Court of *Spain* to come into their Measures.—— I am not reconciled to this Opinion; but my small Skill in Politicks, would rather induce me to imagine, that if the *States* have such Views of establishing a Trade with *Spain*, or of engrossing it to themselves, as they find it to be very advantagous: that then the Motive of their apparent Endeavours to preserve a good Understanding with the Court of *France*, must be a Jealousy of the *English*, lest on their declaring themselves against that Power, we should take the first Opportunity of striking up a Peace with *Spain*, whom they know to be sufficiently weary of the War with us; and then, perhaps, the *Spanish* Trade may regain the old Channel to their Prejudice,

Let what will be the Motive of the peaceful Disposition of the *D—ch*; whether it be owing to politick Views for their own Advantage, or the Power of *French* Gold. (which some here do not scruple to assert)

I assure

I assure you the *H-n-v-r--ns*, are not only displeased, but prodigiously amazed at it; having thought it morally impossible that ever the Time should come when the *States* would behold the *French* in Possession of some of their chief *Barrier* Towns, and endeavouring with a prodigious Army to make themselves Masters of the rest; and yet continue so languid as not to strike a Stroke, nor send out a Man, more than their Alliances obliged them to; acting as if they had no immediate Concern with the War, — even tho' it is at their own Doors.

It is true, say they, the D—ch may prefer the present Advantages of Peace, to the dubious Chance of War; and be unconcern'd at the French becoming Masters of the Barrier, well knowing, that on a Peace, a new Barrier must be established, at the Expence of the Allies; whose Interest, the D—ch alledge, it is to preserve the Barrier, equal with theirs: So that they may think themselves sufficiently excused, by furnishing their Quotas, from an open Declaration against France to the Destruction of their Commerce. But are they certain that the French will content themselves with being in Possession of the Barrier? will they have no Inclination for Antwerp? — is it impregnable? Or should they wait till the French pull off the Mask, and attack that

that Town, would not their Endeavours be too late?— Thus far I absolutely agree with the Politicians here, that *Holland* is in the Wrong for not exerting it self in a most vigorous manner in Defence of the *Barrier Towns*; Surely if they are partly garrison'd by *Dutch Troops*, a *Dutch Army* alone, were it sufficient, might endeavour to defend them when attacked – without giving so much Umbrage to *France* as to create a War. Which, should it happen to be the Consequence; had, in my humble Opinion, better happen before the *French* are become intirely Masters of the *Barrier* than after.

The *Dutch* have certainly very great reason to be exceeding jealous of the *French* possessing themselves either of *Antwerp* or *Ostend*; for should it ever be in their Power to make the first of these Places the Mart of Trade (which they would certainly attempt if once in Possession) would it not retrieve its ancient Splendour, and vie with the most opulent Cities in *Europe*? Especially as it has a superior Advantage to almost any on the Continent, by its Situation on the River *Schelde*, on the eastern Side of which this City is built in the Form of a Bow; where the River is about 400 Yards broad, and deep enough for Vessels of the largest Burthen to come up and unlade upon the

the Keys, which all along before eight of the thirteen Gates, and from the River there runs eight Canals through the Town, deep enough for Vessels of good Burthen.--- In fine, it has as many, if not more Advantages by its Situation than *London* for Commerce; and is of inestimable Value to those that possess it at present---if they do but know it before it is too late.

The Advantages that the *French* would reap by becoming Masters of *Ostend* are infinite; as it is an exceeding good Port, safe, large, and capable of receiving Ships of the greatest Burthen. Should their Arms, (which God forbid) ever prevail so far as to make them Masters of it, there would be an End to what little Share of Traffick the *Queen of Hungary* enjoys, and by their making it a free Port, enable them in a short time to become our Rivals in Commerce, of which they have already but too much Share. And now I cannot help observing, that considering how little advantageous this Port is to the House of *Austria*, when compar'd with what it would be to us in our Hands; I say, that I cannot forbear thinking but that the Acquisition of this Place, would be of more Advantage to us, than any other that we could make on the Continent; and might in some Measure indemnify us for the prodigious Expences

we have been at for the Support of the House of *Austria*, in this and the former War; should the Queen of *Hungary* ever be prevail'd on to cede it to us : As the Conveniency of its Situation would afford us an Opportunity of preventing both the *French* and *Dutch* acquiring too large a Share in Commerce. — But this I must refer to your *Politicians at Home*.

It is true, that most of the Powers on the Continent would be very jealous of such a Cession; and it may be thought, that such a Step would cause a firm Union between *France* and *Holland* to our Disadvantage. — But why we should not reap some Fruits from our Labours and Expence, as well as only benefiting our Neighbours, is what I am at a Loss to comprehend. The Charges of maintaining a sufficient Garrison in the Town would not be so much as may be imagined at first, nor near to what hath been squandered on other ridiculous Projects: And surely we ought to have some Recompence for that great Quantity of Blood and Treasure that we have expended.

You may judge perhaps my Concern for these two Places falling into the Hands of the *French*, to be altogether unnecessary; as they must make many Conquests before they can

can arrive at either of them, and which will probably furnish them with sufficient Work for more *Campaigns* than one. But I do assure you, that the most knowing here, as well as my self, are in some Uneasiness at it, considering the quick Progress of such a victorious Army; as another Victory would completely render them. For then but few of the great Towns would be able to stop the Progress of their Arms; But would surrender to them as fast as they could summons, as they did in the last War to the Duke of *Marborough*, after the Battle of *Ramellies*.

You may be astonish'd at my Assertion, but I do not doubt your agreeing with me in it, when you compare the Strength of the Confederate Army before the Battle of *Fontenoy*, with what it is at present. They were then Choice, picked Troops, being as I may say the Flower of their Countries, and their Courage not depressed by any Misfortunes. Surely their *Generals* ought not to have been too lavish of the Lives of such *Veterans*, nor have forced them on to desperate romantick Attacks; where Success was impracticable: But rather to have preserved them 'till some other Occasion, with the greatest Oeconomy; — well knowing that such a Number of Choice Troops is not soon gather'd together. —

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However glorious the Allied Army might appear before the last Battle, if I am not very much misinformed, they make but an indifferent Figure at present ; insomuch that the Forces which the *Dutch* are sending to join them, will not near be sufficient to fill up their *Corps*. And you know they were the least Sufferers by the Action.—— When the *Hanoverians* will be able to send Recruits from hence, I must confess that I am unable to determine as they must be mostly new raised, it being very dangerous in the present Situation of Affairs to spare too many of the regular Troops out of these Territories. So that however you may reinforce our Army from home, unless *Holland* speedily sends a very great Number of Troops, or some new Forces are hired to join them, their chief Concern this Campaign will be to preserve themselves from being sacrificed: For the Remainder of the once boasted Army of the Allies seem to be harrassed by Fatigues, dispirited by their Success ; and doubtful of the Assistance of each other, should they venture upon another Attempt.

I often indeed, when in *England*, heard Talk of the Destructiveness of our Measures, in entering upon a War on the Continent, without the *Dutch* entirely united with us:
——But

— But I never was so sensibly convinced of the Perniciouſneſs of ſuch an Undertaking as at preſent: And I cannot but declare, that it grieves me to the Soul, that the Blood of ſo many of my brave Country Men ſhould be ſhed ſo raſhly. So that I am pretty certain, ſhould I live to ſee another *Session*, unleſs I am well aſſured every *Ally* will furniſh their utmoſt Aſſiſtance in Men and Money; according to their Ability, without Reſervation. That I ſhall heartily vote for the Recall of our Forces; and thereby convince our Allies that they muſt either contribute to their own Defence, or accept of ſuch Terms as they can obtain, *Engliſh* Blood being too valuable to be thus laſhed away for their different Interests.

It is here given out that there is a great Deſertion from the *French* Army, but I very much fear ſuch Reports have but little Foundation, being only raiſed to encourage a diſheartened People: — Nor can I put much Confidence in them ſince our late ill Succeſs; juſt before which it was alſo reported that the *French* deſerted daily in great Numbers, but on our Engaging it ſeemed as tho' their Army had acquired Numbers rather than loſt any. — But the People muſt be kept in Spirits, by ſome Means or other.

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I am heartily glad that the *States* have ordered Military Execution to be executed on their Runaways and Cowards, for such a well-timed Severity will redound as much to their Honour, as the other does to their Armies Disgrace. But I cannot forbear wishing from my Heart, that if our Honour or Interests compels us to a War with *France*, that we would take some other Measures to Distress her more effectually; for the late War might have entirely convinced us that it is not the Loss of a few of her Towns, the Slaughter of her Soldiers, nor the Expence of her Treasure, that can do it. To what Method then can we have recourse but only destroying her Trade. Would we but exert ourselves upon that Element of which Nature has allotted us the Sovereignty, we could not fail of having Success. — 'Till then we do nothing — but extravagantly waste that Blood and Treasure upon Chimerical *Quixote* Attempts, which were better reserved for our Countries Defence in Time of Danger.

You find by these Maxims, that tho' I have taken a Journey hither, I am not become the more a Courtier, rather the contrary — Tho' I confess the Splendour of *Her-n b--f-n* almost Rivals St. *J--*'s, and has sufficient Allurements to engage any
Man

Man that has Pleasures of a C——t Life more at Heart, than the Wellfare of his C — y. The K — g seems in vast Spirits, and daily appears in Publick. — The C——t—fs is in perfect Health, and I assure you no small Court is paid to her here, — where she dispenses Favours almost unlimited — so that she may well love the Country that affords her Adoration. The Foreign Ministers Flock hither daily, so that we shall soon have a most *brilliant Court* — I wish I could say a *Congress*, for then perhaps some good might be done for establishing and preserving the Peace of *Europe*. The People here are very civil to us *English*, as indeed they had need, but are somewhat jealous of any one encroaching too much on the Royal Favour. But his M——y is extreamly Complaisant to all, and charms every one by his engaging Addresses. They are more polite here than I expected, insomuch that I can assure you, few Courts in *Europe* exceed us at present.

Whether the K — g will take the Field this Summer, or not, I cannot ascertain you; but do not imagine he will, unless the Army should become more numerous than hitherto; otherwise it might not be thought to his Honour to take the Command of an Army so inferior in Numbers to the *French*, neither
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can I perceive any apparent Necessity for his M^y — y venturing his Royal Person in the Field under such Disadvantages. — Let our Allies send wiser or *honest* Generals, more and better Soldiers, and then perhaps the K^g — g may do them the Honour to Command in Person. — It is very probable that he will review the Army when they are reinforced — but I believe that is all — however there is no talk here, even of that, at present.

I hear that the *Irish* Regiments, in the *French* Service, behaved exceeding well in the late Action, but have since suffered by Desertion: But what Use those Deserters can be of to our Army, I cannot imagine; unless their decreasing the Number of the Enemy, for they are not to be trusted. — Every Body, at first, was very much surprised that the Garrison of *Tournay* did not make a Sally, at the Time of the Engagement; but we understand since, that the *French* kept them well secured, by several of their choicest Battalions and Squadrons. They have taken a great many Prisoners, and we but very few, in fine, Fortune seems to have given them more Advantage than we know of at present — and I heartily wish the Campaign may conclude happier for us than it has began, — I suppose you have heard before

before now that the Town of *Tournay* is taken? But the Governour has received Orders to defend the Citadel to the utmost: So that Hostilities are commenced as hot as ever — But 'tis much feared that he cannot long withstand such a fine Battering Train, and such excellent *Engineers* as the *French* have. I have often thought it was much to be lamented, that there was not more Encouragement for Officers in that Branch of Military, in our Service, than there is at present; And Experience has shewn us the want of it. Had we, during the late long Peace, sent some of our young *Engineers* abroad, with proper Salaries, they might have acquired Experience amongst the Powers at War, at that Time, and have been able at this Day to have rendered their Country Service, by supplying the Places of the old ones that drop off. — But, alas! What can be expected from such as never before fired a Piece of Ordnance in Anger. — nor have other Experience than what they acquired since the Commencement of the present War. And should we undertake a Siege, I am afraid our Countrymen would not obtain any great Credit, especially as most of the Towns are exceeding well fortified, and seem to be in more need of Courage in the Inhabitants, than Strength in the Outworks, for their Defence. — How-

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ever, our *Allies* may probably supply us with better *Engineers* than *Soldiers*, and atone for the Courage of the one, by the Skill of the others.

You will now expect that I should send you some Advice of such Negotiations as are going forward here; all that I can acquaint you with, is that my L—d H—gt—n has frequent Conferences with the several Ministers residing at this Court.—— But whether to strengthen our Party in the War, or to bring about a Peace, I am not able to inform you; Affairs here being kept very close and mysterious.—— What I can learn by the best Hands I send you. All here agree, that the Reconciliation, If I may so term it, between the *Elector* of *Bavaria*, and the *Queen* of *Hungary* happened very luckily before the late Action; otherwise, 'tis a great Question, whether it could have been brought about till the Campaign was finished; and some here, do not scruple to assert, that the young *Elector* is somewhat vexed upon his being so hastily guided by the *Old Woman* and the *Priest*; —— and that he repents of his Bargain, whatever Face he may outwardly put on.—— But, for my Part, I should rather be induced to think, that the Success of the late Battle has rather made for, than against him; as it may

may give him an Opportunity of making some fresh Demands upon the Court of *Vienna*, which that Princess may not think proper to refuse him at this Juncture. — He being a *Card* well secured : — 'Tho' some here do not question but if the Allied Army had beaten the *French*, the Queen would have treated him with her usual Haughtiness.

Our deepest Politicians here seem to wish that we had not engaged the *French*, even at the Expence of the Town. — For, say they, the King of *P—ss-a* was certainly treading in the same Steps as the young Elector, by gaining the best Terms he could; and a few Days more would have completed the Affair; — when *France* would have been left much more exposed by the ill Success of a Battle. — But since he has received the News from *Fontenoy*. — His Demands on the Court of *Vienna*, have risen so high, as not to be complied with. — If this be the Case, I heartily wish our young *Hero*, could with Honour, have deferred the Engagement. — Or have afforded the *French* a Diversion by attacking some of their Towns; for I am positive that silencing the K — g of *Prussia* would have been of infinite Advantage, as the Queen by withdrawing her Forces from *Silesia* might in, Conjunction with our Army, have

been able to oblige the *French* to evacuate the *Netherlands*. However, altho' that politick Monarch seemed to hearken to Propositions from *Vienna*, yet it is dubious whether he had any Inclinations for Peace in his Heart; — unless Victory had been on our Side, but that those to amuse the *Queen* till the Event of a Battle shewed itself.

What Promises, the Court of *France* has Power to make, or in what Manner it difuses its Coin, I am at a Loss to guess; nevertheless I cannot forbear being astonished that so many powerful *Protestant Princes* in *Germany*, whose Religion and Interests are incompatible, with those of *France*, enter so readily into her Measures, as to have been for some Time past, her faithful Friends and Allies; — And I cannot forbear often asking of myself, — Is this the Result of our various Treaties for several Years past? What *Princes* have not partook of our Bounties? — What *Electors* have not received our Pay? — Yet, who is there now to help us? — The Power of these *Princes*, singly, indeed, excepting one, is not a Match for *France*, but not united with that one, as their Religion and Interest direct them, they are an Over-match: — Therefore had we, at the Commencement of the War, but brought the four great *Protestant Princes* of *Germany* into

into a thorough and perfect Union amongst themselves; we had then prevented immense Expences, and it would have been impossible for *France*, to have pretended to cope with us and our Allies:—How the Misfortune happen'd that we did not take such Measures, I must leave you to conjecture; considering what an able *Minister* we had then at the Helm,—who knew the Interests of every Court in *Europe* but his own.

I cannot close my Letter, without assuring you, that I heartily wish we had had more regard to our Dependance on such various and incompatible Alliances, as we were engaged in before the Beginning of the War:—Then we should have known how to proceed, and not have run hand over head.—Between two Stools, says the Proverb, *the B—ch falls to the Ground*. And indeed we have verified it, by entering into Alliances with different Powers, of opposite Religions and Interests, that have between them both, left us to fall a Sacrifice, if possible, to the Power of *France*. How we shall extricate ourselves from out of this expensive and ruinous *Land-War*, I am at a Loss to determine, unless Fortune should prove exceeding favourable to our Designs. But 'tis my Opinion, that the
soon-

fooner we do it with Honour, the better ; without having any regard to the specious Pretences, or Interests of such Courts, as have endeavour'd to make us their *Tool*. I should be heartily glad to see Peace restor'd to my Country ; that we might retrieve by *Commerce* what we have lost by *War* : — if possible. — And I believe every true *Briton* is in my way of thinking : As they must have seen, notwithstanding the mighty *Coil* that has lately been kept about the *Balance of Power* in *Europe* ; that every Court is for its own Interest, and entirely regardless of others.

I had almost forgot to acquaint you, that whatever Effect, the indifferent Success of the late Battle at *Fontenoy* may have had amongst others of our Allies ; it does not seem to hasten the Motion of the twelve thousand *Russian* Troops that we were promised so long ago. Should they join our Army at this Juncture, it might give us an Opportunity of once more trying our Fortune in the Field.--- I was just sealing this, when my Man brought me Word that the Post was stopt ; you may be assured every Body was very desirous to know the Cause of such an Accident ; our Anxiety was soon at an End, on hearing that there was an Express just arrived, with the News of an

an Engagement between the *Prussians* and *Austrians*; much to the Advantage of the latter. Every ones Heart was elate with Joy, and some went so far as to propose publick Rejoycings: But how sudden was the Alteration? For on opening the Pacquet, it was found, that the *Saxon* and *Austrian* Forces, were almost totally routed; and that the King of *Prussia* had gained as considerable a Victory, as he could have wish'd for, at this present Juncture. I need not relate the Particulars, as you will certainly have them before this comes to Hand. The Action was bloody, but whether decisive or not, Time must convince: It is almost impossible to give you any Idea of the Effects of such a sudden Turn on our Spirits: The House of Mirth and Joy were almost turned into weeping and mourning: The K — g read the Account with uncommon Sedateness, I heartily wish that the Queens Forces may be able to keep in *Silesia*; but the Courier tells us they were withdrawing very fast. It seems the *Saxons* behaved very valiantly, but suffered prodigiously. What Turn this Victory may give to the political Systems of the several Courts of *Europe*, I am unable to inform you, but our Politicians here make as slight of it as the Affair will permit. I never blame those at the Helm for heartening the People even
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in the greatest Extremity : But it is reasonable to think that such an active Monarch as the King of *Prussia*, will not let this Advantage slip. Whether he will enter the *Saxon* Dominions , or endeavour to recover *Silesia* entirely, we cannot conjecture ; the latter would be most to his Advantage, however, I am afraid the King of *Poland* will have but a bad Neighbour of him in his *Saxon* Territories. I wish he may not bring the War home to his own Doors. If the Queen of *Hungary* should persist in her Attempt of gaining *Silesia*, she must be obliged to withdraw some Forces from her other Armies, which would be giving the Prince of *Conti* a greater Opportunity than his most sanguine Wishes could expect. We do not imagine here, that should the united Forces of *D'Aremberg* and Count *Traun*, come to gain an Advantage of the Enemy, that they could make any considerable Progress in *Alsace* ; but should the Queen be obliged to weaken her Army on the *Rhine*, God knows the Consequence, even under the Prince of *Conti*, happy for us that *Bellisle* is not at their Head ; which it seems here he was destined for, after he had finished his Negotiations at some particular Courts : Providence ordered it otherways, and you have the Happiness to detain that expert General and consummate Politician

litician in *England*; who in the Opinion of those that are better acquainted with his Abilities than I can pretend to be, is of more Worth than half the *French* King's Forces. He has acquired perfect Skill in the Field, and deep Penetration in the Closet.

We expect that the *Czarina* will immediately succour the King of *Poland* if he should be attacked in his *Saxon* Dominions, on Account of assisting the Queen of *Hungary*: But I heartily wish, that the *Prussians* may not gain too considerable Footing in those Territories before the Arrival of the *Russian* Forces, should they be as long in coming as they have been to the Queen of *Hungary*'s Assistance, their Arms would be rendered useless: But should that Princess really interfere in this Quarrel, has not *France* Power, or Influence at the *Porte*, to give that Monarch a Diversion in *Poland*. We that have not the Power of penetrating the Mysteries of the Cabinet, can only reason upon Conjecture: But have we not seen Improbabilities come to pass? — Why not those that we know to be very probable! — The Grand Duke of *Tuscany* will, it is almost certain, carry his Election to the Empire; and the Circle seem to be very ready to furnish an Army of Observation: I understand that they have already agreed on
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their respective Quota's; and that Field Marshal Count *Seckendorff* is to have the Command. — The utmost Efforts of the *Austrians* then seems to be obtaining the Grand Duke to become Head of the Empire; which done, this Army of Observation, under so compleat a General, will be of infinite Service to that House: But 'tis probable that when *France* perceives she cannot gain her Point in the Empire, she will have Recourse to some other Projects, whereby she may indemnify herself for the prodigious Charges she has been at, by maintaining and securing her Acquisitions in the *Netherlands*. — I, for my Part, shall always continue to think, that as she can expect no great Advantages from any Acquisitions in *Germany*, that her Efforts on that Side are only to keep those Troops in play; which otherwise might retard her Conquests in *Flanders*, which are of more Importance to her than any that she can attempt elsewhere.

I cannot, my dear Friend, help wishing; again, that the first of our setting out in Warfare, had been to secure *Prussia* to our Side: But it seems the *French* Statesmen were more vigilant than ours; and tho' it is pretended, that *French* Politicks have no Sway at the *Hague*, they have effectually at the Court of *Berlin*. — It may not, even

ven yet, be too late to engage that penetrating Monarch in our Cause: But, I fear, it must be brought about by some abler Minister, than we have at present, at that Court. — If the King of *Prussia* persists in his strict fulfilling the Engagements he has entered into with the *French*, it will certainly stir up a War in the *North*. — The Consequence Heaven knows! — But I am apt to believe, it is the Interest of the *Czarina* to be as much at Peace as possible lest her Crown, which hangs but tottering, should be shook by some of her malecontent Subjects. — Revolutions in that Kingdom, you know, are not unnatural. — And I believe the *French* Politicians are acquainted with the Fort and Feeble of most Courts in *Europe*. I hope that our Statesmen at Home act with the greatest Unanimity; and that private Interest does not clash with Publick: Nor do I despair of the Result of our Councils, whilst such able Politicians are concerned. I assure you, that the late Nomination of the R——n——y gives me the greatest Pleasure. — My L——d H——n goes thro' a vast deal of Business here; and his M——y confides entirely in his Adm——st——n. — here is great Talk of another Attempt to dislodge the *French*, pray God it may prevail, otherwise, they will become entirely Masters of the

the *Barrier*. This Campaign will cause great Alterations in the several Systems of the Courts of *Europe*; and at the End will permit us to conjecture, Whether we shall have a long War, or a Peace? —

I almost long to hear of some Action of our Fleets, for I really think that we have had but very indifferent Success upon the Ocean, so that unless our Commanders speedily exert themselves we shall lose the Appellation of a *Maritime Power*; and would our Neighbours but join us, we might be able to indemnify ourselves from any Conquests that the *French* should make on the Continent: But it is whisper'd here, that they have some Design against our *American Settlements*; if so they have the Advantage of us, and pay us in our own Coin. I hope, that before the War is over, we shall have some Views that Way, but not a *Carthage* Affair. I believe you are sensible that we neither want good Sailors, good Soldiers, nor good Politicians: But — the Mail is just going, which obliges me to conclude abruptly, by assuring you that I am as above written.

F I N I S.



